The Pragmatic Interplay Between Media and Political Policy: An Analysis of The Day After and Its Implications on American Cold War Nuclear Policy and Opinion by Dawkins, Claire
Proceedings of the New York State Communication Association 
Volume 2020 Article 4 
November 2021 
The Pragmatic Interplay Between Media and Political Policy: An 
Analysis of The Day After and Its Implications on American Cold 
War Nuclear Policy and Opinion 
Claire Dawkins 
SUNY New Paltz, dawkinsc1@hawkmail.newpaltz.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/nyscaproceedings 
 Part of the Communication Commons, Cultural History Commons, Social History Commons, and the 
United States History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dawkins, Claire (2021) "The Pragmatic Interplay Between Media and Political Policy: An Analysis of The 
Day After and Its Implications on American Cold War Nuclear Policy and Opinion," Proceedings of the New 
York State Communication Association: Vol. 2020 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/nyscaproceedings/vol2020/iss1/4 
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Proceedings of the New York State Communication Association by an authorized editor of 
DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu. 
The Pragmatic Interplay Between Media and 
Political Policy: An Analysis of The Day After and Its 
Implications on American Cold War Nuclear Policy 
and Opinion  
 
 
Claire Dawkins, State University of New York at New Paltz 
 





On November 10th, 1983 the TV movie, The Day After aired in the living 
rooms of homes across America. This dramatic portrayal of a nuclear attack 
on the citizens of Kansas and Missouri, scared Americans watching. Depicting 
the desolate landscape of a post-nuclear-attack world, paired with the feeling 
of inevitability of nuclear destruction, the American people began to change 
their feelings about nuclear weapons. But why does this movie matter? And 
how can we trace any meaningful influence this movie had on American 
Culture and understanding of nuclear war? This paper intends to expose the 
ways The Day After changed American society from the average American, to 
the Reagan administration making important policy decisions. 
 
This movie did three things, first it increased nuclear awareness in America’s 
general public with an increase in letter writing campaigns, voting and general 
concern in foreign affairs. Next, anti-nuclear organizations were able to use 
this movie as a steppingstone to increase awareness and raise money for 
anti-nuclear campaigns. Finally, anxiety from the general public creeped into 
the white house and we can see real-time rapid changes to public policy and 
foreign relations in Reagan’s administration. 
 
This paper exposes how forms of media and art can create real change 
politically, socially and culturally. Instead of responding to change, we can 
see media shaping change. 
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On November 20th, 1983, the TV movie, The Day After was broadcast in 
homes across America. Viewers settled into what, at first, appeared to be a 
story about everyday life in Kansas and Missouri. The first half of the movie 
depicts the lives of Dr. Russel Oakes and his family, Billy McCoy, an airman 
stationed outside of Kansas City, and the Dahlberg family in Harrisonville 
Missouri, over thirty miles away from Kansas City. The Oakes struggle with 
the reality that their daughter is moving out, while the Dahlbergs prepare for 
the wedding of their oldest daughter, Denise. In the background, radios and 
televisions murmur about escalating political tensions and nuclear threats, but 
no one pays them much mind. The characters move through their days with 
mentions of Communism and international political tensions always lingering 
in the background, on televisions and radios.   
 
Suddenly, air raid sirens go off, signaling the beginning of a nuclear attack. 
Across Kansas City and Lawrence, citizens scramble for shelters to escape the 
fallout zone. Finally, a nuclear blast hits Kansas City. The rest of the scene is 
a nuclear blast in action; citizens close to the blast zone are immediately 
incinerated. Their skeletons glow as their bodies are vaporized in the nuclear 
blast. A mushroom cloud appears over the horizon, Dr. Russel Oakes sees the 
effects of the nuclear blast from outside the city. The last half of the movie 
shows life after the nuclear blast and how radiation affects the people left. 
The youngest Dahlberg, Danny goes blind after looking directly at the nuclear 
blast. Denise Dahlberg, Danny, Russel Oakes and a hitchhiking college 
student are all slowly killed by radiation poisoning. And the movie closes with 
Professor Huxley, a supporting character, trying to contact survivors with a 
radio. No one responds.  
 
How did the American public react to this movie? To put it plainly, not well. 
The image of the mushroom cloud, vaporized people, and the lasting effects 
of nuclear radiation alarmed the public. While Americans were exposed to 
conversations about nuclear war and conflicts with the Soviets, the 
information they had was limited and often wrong. U.S. officials widely 
circulated images of the Mushroom cloud hovering over Hiroshima, but they 
were not transparent about the real effects of a nuclear blast and how 
radiation can affect the human body in the fallout zone (Masco, 2008, p.368). 
Many Americans felt betrayed and scared when they were faced with the 
reality of nuclear weapons through a TV movie. Renee Blackwell, a 15-year-
old student told The New York Times, ''I think I'd rather die than survive a 
nuclear war...Nuclear war was always in the back of my mind, but that show 
really woke me up” (Collins, 1983). Others had similar reactions. Martin 
Ebert, an engineer who sold nuclear survival suits explained that after The 
Day After hit screens across America, he saw a significant increase in his 
sales. Before November of 1983, the majority of his sales were to 
Government agencies, but for the first time a market opened up to an 
average citizen (“Increased Sales,” 1983). Public outcry and preparation are 
two ways the public responded to The Day After, but the effects of this movie 
go further than just this.   
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The Day After was a cultural phenomenon that shifted how Americans thought 
about nuclear weapons, Soviet and American relations, and the Cold War. 
This paper focuses on the cultural implications of this movie in Reagan’s 
America. Why was The Day After so important in its moment? What made this 
movie a cultural phenomenon? How did it influence how Americans thought 
about nuclear weapons? This paper will argue that The Day After influenced 
political action in many spheres. First, The Day After helped pro-freeze 
organizations extend their messages and agendas, which rallied for total 
nuclear disarmament and an extension of world peace. The Day After also 
created a sense of nuclear fear in the American public not seen since the 
1960s, thus politicizing Americans around nuclear weapons more than any 
time before. Finally, The Day After pushed the Reagan administration to 
change its nuclear stances and created change in how the world community 
understood nuclear war. The Day After did not just reflect the political climate 
of the 1980s, Cold War America, it drove political change and affected policy. 
Three major changes came about after The Day After: the American public 
became more politicized and concerned about nuclear war, pro-freeze 
organizations took the opportunity to increase their campaigning and 
activism, and the Reagan administration drastically changed their nuclear 
policies as a direct result of the movie.   
 
The Day After movie represented an important cultural and political event in 
the 1980’s America, but it is largely absent from the scholarship on that 
period. Scholars have written extensively about cultural representations of 
nuclear war, but most scholars focus on the cultural climate of the 1950s, and 
1960s at the height of McCarthyism and the Hollywood blacklist. In the 
article, “Sheltering Time: The Containment of Everyday life in Nuclear-Shelter 
Film Narratives” Andrea Vesentini explores how nuclear shelters were 
depicted in movies and their meaning in a larger cultural context. Vesentini 
argues that, “Films were also more effective than pamphlets in that they 
provided a vision of the bomb. In order to stress the actuality of the threat, 
civil defense used videos to generate terror among the population with a 
spectacle of disaster” (Vesentini, 2015, p.43). Vesentini emphasizes the 
weight that films carry for an audience, but she focusses on 1950s and 1960s 
movies and leaves out the nuclear fear movies of the 1980s, including The 
Day After. Frances Stonor Saunders has a similar issue in his book, The 
Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. Saunders’ book 
focused once again on the 1950s and 1960s, and the House Un-American 
Activities committee. Saunders’ approach is to analyze how the United States 
Government controlled and censored movies for their own gain. Saunders 
argues that the U.S. government manipulated the film industry to warp 
American’s perceptions of Communism. Saunders’ focus is the reverse of 
mine. He looks at how the American government attempted to change its 
citizens' political opinions, while this paper investigates how a movie changed 
political opinions of Americans without any influence from the government. 
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The scholarship on Cold War movies lacks a necessary investigation into the 
1980s. This paper intends to fill that gap in the scholarship.  
 
Histories of America under Reagan and general histories of 1980s political and 
cultural history also leave out The Day After. In Beth A. Fischer’s article, “US 
Foreign policy under Reagan and Bush”, she explains Reagan’s foreign policy 
initiatives during his term. Reagan began his term throwing threats at the 
Soviet Union about nuclear weapons, and then made a sudden transition in 
his policies in January of 1984 (2012, p.274). Yet, like many other scholars, 
she does not mention The Day After which came out only two months before 
Reagan’s policy change and created mass hysteria in the American public. It 
is only when The Day After is the main subject of scholarship do we see 
Reagan and the movie together.  
 
In the article, “‘Remember! It’s only a movie!’ Expectations and Receptions of 
The Day After (1983)” Deron Overpeck focusses on the political influences of 
the movie’s production, and the responses of the public and political 
organizations. This lens is important, yet it is only found in histories of film, 
almost never in political histories of the United States under Reagan. What 
differentiates this paper from Overpeck’s is that first, Overpeck argues that 
this movie had no meaningful change on public opinions on nuclear policy. 
And second, Overpeck does not draw connections between Reagan’s change 
in nuclear policy in 1984 to the film released just a few months earlier. This 
paper will argue that The Day After had larger implications, focusing on 
everyday Americans and political, pro-freeze organizations.  
 
The Day After sets a precedent on how we can view the interactions between 
media and history. Unlike most films which act as a reaction to a historical 
moment, or change, The Day After acts as a facilitator for change. It is vital to 
take this framework and begin to apply it to how we see other forms of media 
possibly shaping political opinions and even government actions. We are still 
living in the political and social fallout of the Cold War, so it is necessary to 
first, look at how media shaped opinions and actions in the moment it was 
created, but also how media continues to shape us today. Movies are no 
longer only a reaction to politics and society, but they can actively shape it; 
by viewing media in this way, not only can new social commentaries about 
the past be made, but also about our present moment. At the bare minimum, 
this paper intends to convince you of The Day After’s importance in 1980s 
politics and social opinion. But in the larger scope of importance and lasting 
impact, this paper is meant to also shift your opinion on the lasting impacts 
media of all forms have on individual opinions and also how they cause 
change on a larger scale.  
  
Historical Context  
 
4
Proceedings of the New York State Communication Association, Vol. 2020 [], Art. 4
https://docs.rwu.edu/nyscaproceedings/vol2020/iss1/4
Nuclear weapons defined the political climate of the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The American public was anxious about aggressions from the Soviet 
Union. President Carter and later President Reagan only increased those 
fears. Jimmy Carter’s presidency was laced with anxiety from the American 
public. Carter focused on human rights appeals, pulling American forces out 
of other countries and slowing the arms race. In 1979 Carter negotiated with 
the Soviet Union to slow the production of nuclear weapons for both sides in 
the SALT II meetings. But to the public, it appeared that the Russians were 
increasing their arsenal, while the Americans were decreasing theirs (Frankel, 
1992, p.96). Polls taken in 1977 and 1978 showed that for the first time since 
the 1960s, a majority of American citizens were worried about Soviet power 
and the threat of Communism (Njølstad, 2012, p.149). Americans were 
feeling the threat of nuclear war hanging over their heads, yet it appeared 
that their leader was not fighting back.  
 
Carter’s foreign policies focused on the global south, namely Panama, and 
other developing nations. This made the American public think that he was 
not only failing at Soviet/U.S. relations, but also essentially ignoring it. Carter 
also failed in the eyes of the American people over the Iran Hostage crisis. On 
November 4th, 1979, revolutionaries took over Iran and the Shah fled, 
allowing a new government to take his place. Americans working in 
government offices in Iran were taken hostage. Months passed and Carter 
continued to fail to negotiate with the Iranians, leaving the Americans there 
for 444 days. As an insult to Carter, the hostages were not released until he 
left office (Frankel, 1992, p.27). President Carter’s foreign policy failures 
created a move towards conservative, pro-American thought in the American 
public. These sentiments assisted President Reagan’s election in 1980.  
 
In the 1980s, Americans were nervous. Ronald Reagan, who had just entered 
office, promised to crack down on Communism. After Jimmy’s Carter’s relaxed 
policies on Communism, many Americans were nervous about Soviet and 
American relations. Reagan promised to be tough on Communism. In 1981, 
Reagan vowed: “[The West] will dismiss [Communism] as some bizarre 
chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written” 
(Fischer, 2012, pp.269-270). This quote, like many others, was a direct threat 
to the Soviet Union, and Communism at large. In 1981, Reagan was just 
beginning his presidency, and his stance on Communism needed to be firm 
for the American public to support him. Reagan was not afraid to express his 
opinions of the Soviet Union to the American public and the world at large. 
Yet on the other side of the spectrum, Americans were becoming increasingly 
worried once again about the reality of a nuclear war.   
 
Reagan moved quickly to arm America and to let the American public know he 
was doing so. In a total reversal of Carter’s SALT II policies, Reagan rapidly 
increased American nuclear warheads and America expanded the military. The 
years 1981 to 1985 saw the largest increase of peacetime military funding in 
America to date (Fischer, 2012, p.270). In March 1982, Reagan announced 
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his plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which promised to protect 
Americans from Soviet ballistic missiles. This plan outlined that shields would 
be erected around the coasts of major cities. Many Americans became 
concerned about the cost of this project, while world leaders became nervous 
for their own safety. European countries worried that they would now become 
the main target of Soviet attacks (Hilstrom, 2006, p. 402).   
 
While Reagan built up America’s nuclear arsenal and boosted the military, he 
publicly shamed the Soviets for their weapons. In Spring of 1982 he 
announced START, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. These talks were 
meant to equalize the number of nuclear warheads in each country. Yet the 
guidelines of this agreement required that the Soviets would destroy more 
than half of their arsenal, while American continued to build theirs up. To no 
one’s surprise, the Soviets did not agree to this. Tensions grew. In November 
of 1981, Reagan proposed the zero option treaty which once again favored 
the US. It called for the removal of all intermediate-range nuclear weapons 
from Europe, but at this time the Soviets were the only ones with weapons in 
Europe (Fischer, 1997, p. 484). Once again, the Soviets refused. Beth A. 
Fischer, a historian of Cold War America, explains, “Washington made little 
effort to address Soviet concerns or to offer proposals that Moscow could find 
remotely acceptable. This strongly suggested that the Reagan administration 
was not genuinely interested in arms control.” (1997, p.485). Americans were 
getting the idea that Reagan was not looking to negotiate. He was just 
looking for weapons and defense.  
 
America went from a liberal, relaxed leader who supported nuclear 
disarmament, to an aggressive conservative leader who was focused on 
building up nuclear arsenals more than anything else. Because of Carter’s 
focus on disarmament, the American public was nervous about being 
unprepared and for an impending nuclear war. This anxiety is what enabled 
Reagan to be elected. Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy with the Soviet 
Union, paired with his pro-nuclear agenda, made Americans feel a new, 
different kind of fear. Instead of fearing that they would be unprepared, the 
American public was now worried about egging on a nuclear war which would 
send the global community into ruins. While many Americans felt that Carter 
was not tough enough on Communism, when Reagan came into office, his 
policies scared Americans in a new way. The shift in nuclear fears in the early 
1980s begins with Reagan and his aggressive rhetoric and plans.  
  
The Day After  
 
While military tensions are rising in the US, writer Edward Hume, director 
Nicholas Meyes and producers, Robert Papazian and Stephanie Austin began 
to develop The Day After. In the beginning stages of the movie’s production 
the United States Department of Defense offered the filmmakers money for 
production, on the grounds that the script would blame the Soviet Union for 
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the war. The team denied the funding (Overpeck, 2012, p. 272). At first the 
team advertised The Day After as an a-political movie, harboring no 
favoritism or agenda. Deron Overpeck explains how an a-political framework 
for the movie began to break down: “[Hume] relied exclusively on pro-freeze 
or disarmament texts, or sources that emphasized the horrendous destruction 
that would ensue after a nuclear exchange” (Overpeck, 2012, p.273). Hume 
was directly referencing pro-freeze documents when he was writing the 
movie, all of his inspiration came from the framework of pro-freeze 
organizations. From the beginning of the project, Meyer and Hume were 
infusing this movie with political motives and bias, as it is almost impossible 
to tell the story of a nuclear attack without politics. As The Day After was 
gaining media attention and the public began to talk about this TV event, 
nuclear freeze organizations were given early access to the movie and ample 
advertisement slots (Overpeck, 2012, p.279). This angered conservatives who 
supported America’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, because despite claiming to 
be a-political, The Day After team was demonstrating the exact opposite. 
Finally, just a few weeks before the movie was released, the film makers 
came forward and announced that the movie had a pro-freeze leaning, and 
now citizens just had to wait for the movie in order to make up their own 
minds.  
  
The Days Before  
 
The opening scene of The Day After reads: “We are grateful to the people of 
Lawrence, Kansas for their participation and help in the making of this film” 
(Meyer, 1983). The Day After filmed on location, using the local residents as 
extras. Lawrence Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri seemed like odd places to 
base a nuclear attack movie, but that was exactly what the filmmaker 
wanted. The central characters are everyday Midwesterners. Dr. Oakes is a 
dedicated doctor, with a loving relationship with his wife and daughter, the 
Dahlbergs are a farming family, and Billy McCoy is a dedicated airman 
working for the military, stationed just outside of Kansas City. These 
characters were specific representations of “everyday Americans.” These 
people do not live in a big city or work prestigious jobs, but they are as 
susceptible to nuclear attack as anyone in the country. The idea that any 
American could be hit by a nuclear attack was ingrained into the minds of the 
audience from the moment they tuned into the film. Thirty minutes into the 
movie, Dr. Oakes and a coworker discuss the reports, “There are even people 
leaving Kansas City because of the missile field. Now I ask you, where does 
one go from Kansas City? Yukon? Tahiti? We are not talking about Hiroshima 
anymore…” (Meyer, 1983, 32:17-32:35). Characters are discussing that there 
is nowhere to go. The movie implies that if places like Kansas City were in 
fear of being bombed, no place in America was safe.  
 
The Cold War serves as a vague backdrop to the daily lives of the characters. 
In the first half of the movie, characters hear TV and radio reports of Soviet 
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aggression in Europe, as tensions rise in East and West Germany. East 
Germany invades West Germany and drops bombs on their hospitals, schools 
and government facilities. Things start heating up when Steven Klein hears 
that Soviets have invaded West Berlin. This scene is a commentary on Cold 
War politics. No matter how antinuclear this movie may be, the filmmakers 
still made Communists the aggressors. One girl in the crowd says “Fantasy 
Land” in response to the news broadcaster speculating about nuclear 
weapons. She offers a politically driven critique of American military policy: 
“Look, did we help the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Afghans or the Poles? 
Well, we're not going to nuke the Russians to save the Germans. I mean if 
you were talking oil in Saudi Arabia, I’d be real worried.” (Meyer, 1983, 
36:29-36:45). For a movie that originally claimed the be anti-political, a 
strong commentary on American foreign policy and its violent links to the oil 
industry are seen here. Steven Klein decides to hitchhike home, Dr. Oakes 
leaves work to be with his family, and the Dahlbergs leave church to prepare 
their basement as a shelter. The next scene is in a supermarket where 
residents of Kansas City are pushing one another and running for the 
registers. While on line, Denise Dahlberg’s fiancé, Bruce Gallatin, overhears a 
news report that the Russians hit an American ship in the Persian Gulf. Once 
again, Communists are the aggressors, leaving the American government in a 
positive light, for now.  
 
Moving to the Dahlberg’s home, the viewer gets a quick glimpse into their 
lives. Mr. Dahlberg anxiously prepares the basement, and his wife refuses to 
acknowledge the problem and continues to prepare for the wedding. Mr. 
Dahlberg, along with many other characters prepare for the bomb, yet none 
of them seem to be adequately equipped to prepare their homes and stock 
supplies. The scenes of family life are cut between images of military 
preparation as soldiers run frantically to prepare and await orders from the 
government. Finally, in the distance, missiles launch and the realities of 
nuclear attack begin to set in. The airmen stationed at the Whiteman Airforce 
panic and run into an underground shelter. Billy McCoy leaves, against orders, 
to be with his family. Themes of family and companionship are strong 
throughout the movie, seen in the relationships and decisions each character 
makes.  
 
The sirens sound, and families rush into city hall to a nuclear shelter. An 
aerial shot of main street shows citizens like ants running frantically. Then the 
bomb hits. First all the electric power goes out, all cars and trucks stop 
working, and then the flash. From Dr. Oakes’ view from his car on the 
highway, we see the full mushroom cloud. People scream as they are engulfed 
in the blast and their skeletons glow as they are vaporized. Many of the 
images of vaporized people are scenes with children and families, one is even 
of a wedding. Kansas City is destroyed. We see houses and businesses 
engulfed in flames, blown over from the blast and buried under rubble. The 
only survivors are those in the fallout zone, who only see the massive 
explosion, but do not immediately feel the effects.   
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After the Bomb  
 
There is chaos in the homes and buildings of the survivors. In the hospital, 
patients resort to violence, and Dr Oakes needs to calm down a crowd. He 
asks them to help the most injured and sick. The Dahlbergs have a visitor in 
the upstairs of their house, and Steven comes down to stay with them after 
being threatened by Mr. Dahlberg. Next, we see Billy McCoy wandering the 
destroyed town around him. He passes a memorial that says, “In Memory of 
our World War Veterans” and in front of it a father and young son lay dead 
(Meyer, 1983, 1:15:20-1:15:33). This acts as a commentary on the victims of 
the nuclear attack as victims of a world war, fighting in a war they cannot 
win. Joe Huxely, a university professor, contacts Dr. Oakes over the radio and 
notes the high levels of nuclear radiation in the air. More nuclear radiation is 
moving in by wind from more nuclear silos out west. We are reminded of the 
good, pious Christian citizens of middle America when the Dahlberg’s attend 
church despite the effects of radiation still present in the air. Denise is 
beginning to feel the effects of the radiation poisoning and her groin begins to 
bleed, and she passes out during the sermon. As Stephen brings Denise and 
Danny to the university hospital on a horse-drawn carriage, they pass men 
who are hauling dead bodies on the flatbed of a truck. Danny asks Stephen 
what he sees, he lies and says cows and telephone poles, things that remind 
Danny of life before the blast.  
 
In an act of satire, the President is broadcasted over the radio and tells an 
uplifting message that the U.S. has not backed down from conflict, "There is 
at the present time, a ceasefire with the Soviet Union which has sustained 
damage equally catastrophic... we are counting on you, on your strength, 
your patience, your will and your courage to help rebuild this great nation of 
ours. God Bless us all" (1:39:55-1:42:05). This voice over is cut with scenes 
of the suffering people, it shows the dead and dying, families hiding under 
rubble and the destroyed state of life and routine. There is a strong anti-
government sentiment throughout the remainder of the movie. After this 
catastrophe, the citizens are no longer willing to listen to the government’s 
advice and action. Farmers including Mr. Dahlberg are told they must get rid 
of their remaining topsoil, but they have no solutions to purify the soil after 
that (1:48:07- 1:49:56). The remaining American government is asking its 
citizens to think of the needs of the larger United States, yet individuals can 
hardly keep their families alive.   
 
In the action packed last fifteen minutes of the movie, Mr. Dahlberg is shot by 
a roaming group which squatted on his property, and Dr. Oakes is quickly 
succumbing to the effects of radiation. As Dr. Oakes leaves the hospital and 
makes his way towards Kansas City a firing squad executes two men on the 
side of the road. The United States government no longer has power over its 
citizens, they are taking on responsibility for themselves. As the radiation 
poisoning overcomes each character their skin turns pale and their hair falls 
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out in thick chunks. When Dr. Oakes arrives at Kansas City everything is 
destroyed, all that is left is the ghosts of buildings. There are scavengers 
stealing wedding rings and other valuable items off of corpses. In the final 
scene Dr. Oakes comes across his old house, now nothing more than a pile of 
rubble. As Dr. Oakes collapses on the ground in distress a stranger embraces 
him, and the camera fades out. The movie closes with these lines passing 
over the screen:   
 
“The Catastrophic events you have just witnessed are, in all likelihood, 
less severe than the destruction that would actually occur in the event 
of a full nuclear strike against the United States. It is hoped that the 
images of this film will inspire the nations of this earth, their peoples 
and leaders, to find the means to avert the fateful day” (2:04:57 -
2:05:13).  
 
The movie is over and the audience is left with the lasting images of war and 






Faced with the dramatic images of explosions and nuclear war, Americans 
were terrified. In the weeks leading up the showing of The Day After news 
outlets talked incessantly about the premiere of the movie. People prepared in 
a variety of different ways. Young children were not advised to watch the 
movie at all, while children ages twelve to fifteen could watch but they would 
be closely monitored for signs of distress or anxiety afterwards (Overpeck, 
2012, p.280). On the ground in schools and homes, parents and educators 
were seriously worried about the lasting effects these horror filled images 
could have on children. Dr. Howard H. Hiatt, the head of Harvard’s Graduate 
School of Public Health warned a group of advanced high school students: “be 
prepared for a dreadful experience… But see it” (Kraft, 1983, p.2). As 
conversations continued in schools, excitement increased for the movie, and it 
became a topic in the media, in the classroom, and in schools. Across 
America, teachers were encouraged to lead discussions about the movie, 
before and after it aired. Students had a variety of opinions and emotions 
after seeing the movie, Nora Maccoby, a 16-year-old high school student 
explained, “I expect to see [nuclear war]. I expect it in my lifetime” (“Viewers 
Shocked”, 1983). Maccoby was not alone, many American citizens believed 
that nuclear war was destined to happen. The threat of a nuclear strike 
constantly hung over the head of American citizens, and the images of 
suffering and destruction in The Day After did nothing more than heighten 
these fears.   
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Just like Maccoby, many people dramatically reacted to the film. In order to 
begin to understand public response, we should look at how The Day After 
was discussed in newspapers and between American citizens. In a New York 
Times article just three days after the movie explains, “On the day after ‘The 
Day After,’ the ‘experts’ gave us little reason for celebrating this year’s 
Thanksgiving Day. It was just a ‘movie,’ some of them said, but they didn’t 
say it in Hiroshima or Nagasaki” (Reston, 1983, p.A23). Here, the journalist, 
James Reston, is explaining the overwhelming feeling of dread and fear felt 
across the nation. Some people had more compassionate responses. Instead 
of looking towards a desolate future, or vilifying the Soviet Union, a mother 
said after the film that, “I think it’s very important for us to be nurturing 
compassion in our hearts,” said Ruth Stewart. “When I think of our mothers, I 
think of mothers in Russia who also don’t want their children killed” 
(Linenberger,1983). Unlike many other Americans, Stewart chose to 
empathize with the citizens of the Soviet Union. As we will see later on, the 
safety of children is a common factor across all aspects of the nuclear 
weapons debate.  
 
The American public did not take this TV movie event lightly. Doctors began 
freeing up their schedules weeks in advance to see patients who felt 
traumatized by The Day After (Rothenberg, 1983). Immediately after the 
movie was shown American citizens began writing to President Reagan asking 
for his response. A letter written by a distraught watcher says: “‘Dear 
President Reagan: Our country must not wait until the day after a nuclear 
war. We must negotiate an end to the extreme danger posed by nuclear 
weapons now.” The letter ends with, “‘Please Mr. President give us tomorrow’” 
(Cardarella, 1983, p.1). The White House received so many calls the night of 
the movie that their switchboard operators required a full day to count them 
all. And ABC headquarters also reported an influx of calls, mostly in support 
of the movie (Overpeck, 2012, p.280).   
 
The Day After also popularized certain specific fears associated with nuclear 
radiation and attack. In the book, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the 
Sixties and the Making of Eighties America, Philip Jenkins explains the way 
people thought about nuclear attack before The Day After. Jenkins explains a 
common fear called the “nuclear winter theory” where a nuclear war could 
damage the ecosystem and climate of the world so much that it would cause 
a human extinction (222). Whether it was residual radiation directly killing 
people or the destruction of the environment, a nuclear war which would 
destroy any means for human survival. We can see this represented in scenes 
with Mr. Dahlberg and other farmers, where they are asked to get rid of their 
topsoil and prepare the ground for new planting when it is safe. But the 
farmers in the film are given no clear direction on how and when they will 
know their soil is safe once again. There is a direct connection between the 








From the beginning, the political bias of The Day After had been strong. From 
the first stages of writing and producing, The Day After was created with anti-
nuclear, Pro-Freeze sentiments in mind. Because of this, pro-freeze 
organizations were eager to utilize this movie to their advantage. Pro-freeze 
organizations ran rallies and protests nationwide to support disarmament, “In 
June 1982 over a million people attended a rally in Central Park in New York 
City, calling for a freeze of nuclear weapons production” (Robert & Jones, 
2016, p.442). Large protests like this placed Pro-Freeze organizations into 
political conversation and importance. Deron Overpeck (1983), in his article, 
“‘Remember! It’s only a Movie!’ Expectations and Receptions of the Day 
After,” argues that The Day After had little impact on the public opinion of 
nuclear freeze movements but it, “motivate[d] many Americans, ordinary and 
otherwise, to become involved in the nuclear war debate” (p. 268). While 
Overpeck’s argument leaves out the vital influence of The Day After on 
political leanings, he does make strong points about political involvement. 
Pro-freeze organizations capitalized on this push towards politicization by 
setting up voter registration at meetings to discuss The Day After.  
 
One pro-freeze organization called, “The 800-NUCLEAR Project” was explained 
as, “an ad hoc group supported by disarmament organization and individuals 
including Ralph Nader, the consumer advocate, and Hamilton Fish, publisher 
of the Nation magazine” (Smith, 1983). These organizations were linked with 
the peace movement and made political and social work to increase 
awareness about nuclear weapons. Jack Willis, the director of the 800-Nuclear 
Project explained the voter registrations, “The peace movement recognizes 
that people will get depressed and feel helpless after watching the film…. 
That’s why we’re offering ways, such as voter registration, for people to 
channel their frustrations through the political system” (Rothenberg, 1983, 
p.2). These organizations saw the opportunity that The Day After presented, 
and they capitalized on that hysteria.  
 
Pro-freeze organizations such as, the 800-Nuclear Project, Nuclear Weapons 
Freeze Campaign, Let Lawrence Live, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
The Day Before were all eager to use The Day After as a way to further their 
anti-nuclear agendas. These groups showed direct support for these movies, 
Randall Kehler a member of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign saw the 
movie as a reality and explained, “the only sane response… is to protest the 
current nuclear buildup and demand a nuclear freeze” (“Viewers Shocked,” 
1983, p.3). Kehler was not alone. Many other political organizers and activists 
felt that The Day After was a representation of the inevitable destruction by 
nuclear weapons. Disarmament groups saw The Day After as nothing less 
than a positive political move for their campaigns and agendas moving 
towards nuclear peace.  
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These pro-freeze organizations continued to rally behind the movie and 
spread awareness for their cause. These groups also saw the movie as an 
opportunity to show support and compassion to those suffering from anxiety 
from watching the movie. Groups distributed, “hundreds of thousands of 
viewing guides suggesting how to cope with the film: Share your feelings 
before, watch in groups, and, after seeing it, ‘turn off the TV set. Stay 
together… take a few minutes before people begin to speak’” (Rothenberg, 
1983, p.1). These clear guidelines were meant to ease any sense of anxiety 
and give people a constructive outlet on how to express their feelings about 
the movie. Organizations such as the Physicians for Social Responsibility set 
up hotlines for anxious watchers to call if they felt distressed. The group 
explained the need for a hotline as, “given the accurate horror portrayed in 
the movie, these emotions are appropriate.” (Corry, 1983). One of their 
hotlines in Philadelphia received over 400 calls the night of the showing 
(“Viewers shocked,” 1983, p.2).  
 
Pro-freeze organizations were able to comfort people in need and create a 
relationship where they felt supported by these organizations and, therefore, 
more willing to subscribe to their mottos and agendas. This then created a 
larger pro-freeze community across America. Pro-freeze organizations also 
created community events in order to bring people together to watch the 
movie or comment on it in some way. In Lawrence Kansas, and other towns 
across America, pro-freeze organizations held candlelight vigils in response to 
the movie and threats of nuclear attack (Rothenberg, 1983, p.2). 
Organizations also set up letter writing campaigns in communities to urge 
Reagan to change his nuclear policies. Pro-freeze organizations were creating 
a direct link to communities which allowed their rhetoric and agenda to be 
more readily accepted in the communities they entered. These organizations 
were so successful because members were trained on how to speak to the 
media. Members were each given a pamphlet which taught them how to 
represent the organization in interviews (Overpeck, 2012, p.277). Pro-freeze 
organizations took the opportunity which They Day After presented, and they 
were able to rally support for their respective organizations and claims.   
 
While Pro-Freeze organizations saw this movie as an opportunity to further 
their own agendas, there were many conservative, pro-armament 
organizations who thought differently. Pro-armament organizations and their 
supporters saw this movie as a blatant hit to their ideals and to the Reagan 
administration. One such organization was the Mutually Assured Destruction 
Policy (MAD) which supported nuclear weapons for the protection of the U.S. 
(Overpeck, 1983, 267). Reverend Jerry Falwell was upset that the movie was 
popularizing disarmament in the population; he believed that it would weaken 
America and leave them unprepared for a nuclear attack. Falwell wished to 
boycott the companies who bought advertising time. While he later withdrew 
this threat, many other people who supported nuclear arms as a necessary 
part of American foreign policy saw this movie as a threat to the U.S.’ safety 
(Shales, 1983). Between the pro-freeze organizations, and the conservative, 
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pro-nuclear organization there was an overlap in rhetoric. Once again, 
Reverend Jerry Farwell, a leader of the “Moral Majority,” a conservative 
Christian group, criticized the movie for, “making a blatant political statement 
in favor of disarmament. The future security of this nation and the freedom of 
our children are both at stake” (Rothenberg, 1983, p.2). It is significant that 
Farwell, and other supporters of nuclear weapons buildup make the argument 
that in order to protect the U.S.’ children, they must have strong nuclear 
weapons. Conversely, pro-freeze organizations used the same rhetoric to 
support disarmament. As mentioned earlier, Reverend Bud Cooper (a 
supporter of disarmament) expressed that it was necessary to disarm the 
countries for the safety of the nation’s children (Cardarella, 1983). These 
comparisons show two groups with ideological differences between them, yet 




Before we begin to unravel Reagan’s involvement and reaction to The Day 
After, it is important to consider how other politicians reacted to the movie. 
Conservative, pro-armament politicians and politicians that supported nuclear 
weapons freeze both crafted responses to The Day After, which furthered 
their respective agendas. Senator Alan Cranston from California and 
Representative Edward Markey from Massachusetts, both Democrats, used 
The Day After to support their own policies. Cranston organized fund-raising 
meetings in twenty-six states at the time of the movie’s broadcast. And 
Markey organized an “awareness campaign” in 10 midwestern states, who like 
Lawrence Kansas, are near nuclear missile silos (Corry, 1983). Reactions to 
the movie were not limited to the general public; we can also see a number of 
politicians using this movie to further their campaigns and agendas.  
  
Since the beginning of his presidency, the Reagan administration had felt 
pressure from the American people to reform their nuclear weapons policies. 
In his foreign policy initiatives, Reagan was tough on communism, but his 
administration left the American public generally uninformed about the reality 
of nuclear radiation. Americans were shocked by the second half of The Day 
After. Nuclear weapons had already been a major topic of conversation, but 
the effects of long-term exposure to radiation had not been explained. The 
Reagan administration originally argued a nuclear attack would be survivable, 
but the movie proved that wrong (Overpeck, 2012, p.270). Now the American 
public was losing trust they had in the Reagan administration. Reagan tried to 
limit the damage. He said, “[The movie] didn’t say anything we didn’t know 
and that is that nuclear war is horrible. And that’s why we’re doing what we’re 
doing, so there won’t be one” (“Viewers Shocked,” 1983, p.2). Reagan’s 
response was vague and did not clearly pinpoint a policy or strategy he 
wished to pursue. In his original public responses to the movie Reagan was 
careful not to allude to any plans or policy.   
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Originally, on hearing the news of The Day After’s production, the White 
House began a propaganda campaign right away. Originally, the White House 
wanted Reagan to do a public service announcement immediately after the 
end of the movie where he would, “transform the film into an argument for 
his defense policies” and tell the audience, “that he was shaken by the horrors 
of the film depicted but resolved never to let nuclear war happen” (Hänni, 
2016, p.418). This plan would align Reagan with the American public and 
comfort them, knowing the president had the same fears as them, and was 
willing to do something about it. But because the Reagan administration was 
nervous about being that closely associated with the movie, they pulled-out of 
the deal at the last second (Hänni, 2016, p.418). Reagan was replaced by 
George Shultz, who ended up making a message (Frances, 200, p.235). 
These plans were not the end of Reagan’s propaganda campaign, and they 
continued, for many months after the movie’s airing.  
 
On November 4th, 1983, representatives from government agencies ranging 
from the White House to FEMA met to discuss how each department should 
approach the movie. Their consensus was, “Don’t fight the film, recognize the 
horrors of nuclear war and take the offensive through emphasizing deterrence 
and disarmament agreements” (Frances, 2000, p.235) Even before the movie 
was released, the government was preparing for backlash from the American 
people. The government knew that this movie would expose their policies and 
the true danger of nuclear weapons, so in order to protect themselves in the 
public eye, government officials all agreed not to argue with the images 
presented in the film, in an attempt to maintain trust with the public. In his 
personal diary, Reagan wrote about The Day After and what it meant for his 
outlook on nuclear weapons:   
 
“[The Day After] is powerfully done- all $7 mil. worth. It’s very 
effective & left me greatly depressed. … Whether it will be a help to 
the ‘anti nukes’ or not, I can’t say. My own reaction was one of our 
having to do all we can to have a deterrent & to see there is never a 
nuclear war” (Hänni, 2016, p.418).  
 
Reagan begins this entry with his emotional reaction to the movie, 
expressing that he, like many other Americans, was left distraught after the 
movie. Then, he considers the impacts of this movie, and how it will affect 
his foreign policy initiatives, showing that there is a direct correlation 
between Reagan’s political policy and this movie. From this point forward, 
Reagan and his cabinet created a plan to modify his nuclear policies in light 
of the movie. Ironically, the day after The Day After, the White House held, 
“Day after meetings” where members of Reagan’s cabinet discussed the 
movie and planned how the government should react to it. As mentioned 
earlier, the Reagan administration originally told the public that a nuclear 
attack would be survivable, and the movie proved that incorrect. Instead of 
arguing with the movie’s claims, the administration decided to agree with the 
effects of nuclear radiation as demonstrated in the movie (Hänni, 2016, pp. 
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420-421). And despite pro-armament leanings for the beginning of his 
administration, Reagan and his team changed rhetoric and instead came out 
in support of disarmament. Government employees were told to not 
discourage anyone from seeing the movie, and they were not to dispute any 
of the claims. The administration created a clear plan for each agency and 
government employee to respond to the movie and this is what created 
Reagan’s next policy change.  
 
Now that the American public was more actively afraid of nuclear attack, the 
U.S. government had to respond to the movie in a way which made the public 
feel protected and comfortable. On January 16, 1984 Reagan gave his first 
speech of the year and he made new claims on how he would treat nuclear 
weapons. “With regards to nuclear weapons, the simple truth is America’s 
total nuclear stockpile has declined. Today we have far fewer nuclear weapons 
than we had 20 years ago” (Reagan, 1984). For the first time Reagan was not 
antagonizing the Soviet Union and threatening them with attack. His dramatic 
switch in rhetoric was solely to comfort the American people and make them 
feel like the events of The Day After would not happen again. This approach 
was once again emphasized at the end of the speech: “If the Soviet 
Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can 
strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms” (Reagan, 1984). Reagan made a 
smart political move by placing the blame of nuclear weapons and aggression 
onto the Soviet Union, once again placing the U.S. in a positive light. Like the 
movie depicted, Reagan is expressing that the Soviet Union are the 
aggressors, and the U.S. is just defending themselves.   
 
In his speech Reagan outlined three main plans for his future Cold War 
foreign policies with the Soviet Union. First, a total nuclear disarmament, 
second, to create better relationships and dialogue between Western and 
Communist nations, and finally to have these nationals collaborate on regional 
conflicts such as in Afghanistan (Fischer, 2012, p.273). The goals that Reagan 
presented in this speech were not found anywhere else in his public 
statements or policies. Because of this dramatic shift in policy only two 
months after The Day After, we can conclude that due to the political impact 
of this movie on the population and political groups, that Reagan felt it was 
time to change his policies. The Day After scared Americans into thinking 
nuclear war was around the corner, and it affirmed beliefs that it would be 
impossible to recover from. Because of this intense fear Reagan had to 
change his policies to ease the minds of the American public.  
 
Reagan’s change in attitude towards the Soviet Union did not end with this 
speech. After the film aired, Reagan, again wrote in his diary commenting on 
his last three years in office and explained that he now understood that Soviet 
leaders and citizens feared the U.S. To combat this, “I was anxious to get a 
top Soviet leader in a room alone and convince him that we had no designs 
on the Soviet Union and Russians had nothing to fear from us” (Fizgerald, 
2000, p.238). This was a dramatic change in rhetoric for a leader who spent 
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the first half of his Presidency incessantly threatening the Soviet Union. 
Similarly, in the months between November 1983 and June 1984, Reagan did 
his most international traveling as president. Including visiting China, the first 
Communist nation he visited in his presidency. Here he signed a treaty which 
increased investments and cultural exchanges between the countries. He also 
visited Tokyo, where he called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons 
(Fizgerald, 2000, p.235). Reagan was making clear decisions to create bonds 
with Communist nations in the months after the film was aired. These 
decisions were a direct result of the American public pressuring his aggressive 
policies.   
  
There are a lot of arguments within scholarship on Reagan, the end of the 
cold war, and when exactly he changed his policies. Robert C. Roland and 
John M. Jones in their chapter,  
 
“Reagan’s Strategy for the Cold War and the Evil Empire Address” 
argue that, …Reagan did not ‘shift towards peace’ in January 1984. 
Rather, they suggest that peace and nuclear abolition had long been a 
cornerstone in Reagan’s Soviet policy. Although Reagan’s tone 
changed in the years that followed this address, his critique of the 
Soviet system, commitment to military buildup as a means for 
achieving arms reduction, and faith in the triumph of democratic 
values never did (Robert & Jones, 2016, p.455). Here, the authors 
argue that Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech actually had elements of 
disarmament plans. But I argue that if these claims were present, they 
were overtaken by aggressive pro-American rhetoric. This rhetoric 
threatened the Soviet Union so much it overshadowed any attempt for 
disarmament. Many scholars argue that Reagan’s transition to 
disarmament policies in late 1983 and early 1984 was just a 
culmination of Reagan’s plans and ideologies all along, coming to light. 
Whether or not this is true, I argue that The Day After was the final 
push for Reagan to either reveal his long-standing disarmament 
policies, or to change his policies only to disarmament, which he had 




The cultural and political impact of films and other popular media forms 
cannot be ignored. We are accustomed to films reflecting the political and 
cultural trends of the moment, but there are moments when films and popular 
media can change how citizens think and feel about a subject, so much that 
that film creates a political change. The Day After is an example of a movie 
that took advantage of the nuclear fears present in America and used these 
fears to their own advantage. This paper essentially functions as a case study, 
analyzing how one movie can influence political activism and political leaning 
from an average American citizen to the President of the United States. In our 
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current oversaturated media climate. It is important that we understand the 
complexities and weight that one movie can have on politics and popular 
opinion of an issue. Movies such as The China Syndrome, paired with the 
Three Mile Island nuclear plant meltdown created hysterical nuclear fears 
across the country, but not from an attack, rather from faulty machinery or 
wiring.   
   
The Day After was a highly anticipated TV event. Across the U.S., families 
came together to watch the world end on their TV sets, in their living rooms. 
The images of the mushroom cloud and vaporized bodies scared these 
watchers. But what really influenced Americans was the images of nuclear 
radiation destroying crops, everyday ways of life, and the characters. The 
fallout of nuclear radiation was what changed American’s minds about foreign 
policy and ultimately placed pressure on Reagan. The Day After was a unique 
and poignant example of how popular cultural and media, specifically movies, 
can change public opinion on contemporary issues, and enact change at all 
levels of society, and political involvement. Moving forward, consumers and 
creators of media should look to The Day After and consider its impact as a 
TV Movie. What other movies, TV shows, songs, etc. have had a lasting 
impact and have played a role in a massive shift in opinion and political 
policy?   
 
Though this paper was originally written before the COVID-19 pandemic, in 
revision it is necessary to consider how this approach to seeing media as 
action can be applied to media now depicting COVID-19. Just like the Cold 
War and the Nuclear crisis of the 1980s, we are living in a historic moment. In 
15, 20, or 40 years, will we look back on movies and TV shows which 
discussed COVID-19 and realize it changed our opinions about vaccinations or 
wearing masks? By seeing media not only as a reaction to history, but an 
actor in it, we are giving agency and importance to the popular media we see 
every day. Going forth, consider how world events around you are depicted in 
fictionalized movies, TV shows, songs, novels, etc., and consider if these 
stories are affecting your opinions on the events around you, and maybe even 
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